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The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted businesses worldwide by lowering 
demand, impeding operations, stressing supply chains, and limiting access to finance. Yet we 
still lack an understanding of how firms can successfully adapt to this disruption. We examine 
this issue theoretically by combining arguments around dynamic capabilities and managerial 
cognition and developing several hypotheses concerning firm innovation, knowledge sources, 
management practices, and gender issues in relation to firms’ adaptation to this crisis. We test 
these assertions using data from two rounds of surveys involving more than 11,000 firms from 
28 countries both before and after COVID-19 was officially declared a global crisis. Our results 
provide prima facie evidence that innovators, in particular those who are younger (i.e. start-
ups) and those who rely on internal sources of knowledge, are more likely to adapt to COVID-
19 than non-innovators. Our results suggest that firms with better management practices have 
also greater ability to adapt. We did not find systematic gender differences upon examining 
firms managed by women versus men. Following these findings, we set out several implications 
for research and policy. 
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‘Adversity has the effect of eliciting talents which, in prosperous circumstances, would have lain dormant.’ 
Horace (65–8 B.C.) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization officially declared COVID-19 a pandemic, 
confirming its rapid spread and global reach. As this health crisis unfolded, governments around 
the world responded to the virus by putting in place stringent lockdowns meant to flatten rates 
of infection, hospitalizations and ultimately deaths (Alvarez, 2020). While these restrictive 
measures have been highly effective, they have come with some steep social and economic 
costs which will likely culminate in a global recession (Baker et al., 2020; Baldwin and di 
Mauro, 2020).  
 There has been significant variation across countries in terms of the type of lockdowns 
imposed, their duration and the stimulus packages introduced to curb unemployment and 
business failures (Hasan et al., 2020). In addition, many firms, particularly those in non-
essential industries, have faced a reduced demand for their goods or services, supply chain 
disruptions or unavailability of workers, due to regulations designed to reduce the spread of the 
virus. Thus, from both an academic and a policy standpoint, it is important to understand how 
businesses can adapt to this new environment (Vergne and Depeyre, 2016), since successful 
adaptation is a prerequisite for both performance and, more importantly, firm survival (Helfat 
and Winter, 2011). 
 Prior research on the effects of crises on organizations has overwhelmingly examined 
the consequences of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 on a variety of aspects, such as 
diversification strategies (De Figueiredo, Feldman and Rawley, 2019), corporate takeovers 
(Wan and Yiu, 2009), research and development (R&D) investments (Paunov, 2012), public 
subsidies (Hud and Hussinger, 2015) and financial leverage (Nemlioglu and Mallick, 2021). 
While the COVID-19 pandemic shares certain features with the GFC (e.g. its exogenous nature, 
 
its effect on cash flows, uncertainty levels, monetary and fiscal responses), it is also very 
different in many ways, e.g. mechanisms (housing bubbles versus lockdowns), speed and type 
of economic recovery (V-shaped versus U-shaped) or the type and extent of public policy 
responses (local vs. national; coordinated vs. ad-hoc). This complexity warrants further 
investigation into the responses and strategies of firms in tackling the unique implications of 
this crisis and operating successfully in the post-COVID-19 environment.  
 In this study, we focus on the ability of firms to adapt to this crisis. We examine the 
characteristics of firms and the role that innovation plays in their success. Combining theoretical 
elements from cognition studies and dynamic capabilities, we argue that firms that engage in 
innovation activities are more likely to cope well with the challenges of COVID-19 as they 
benefit from better managerial know-how and increased attention to environmental conditions 
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Eggers and Kaplan, 2009) that allows them to efficiently 
reconfigure their assets and re-calibrate market operations (Teece et al., 1997; Helfat et al., 
2007). In addition, firms that rely on internal knowledge sources as opposed to external ones 
are able to reallocate them more easily to adapt to COVID-19 (Zouaghi, Sanchez and Martinez, 
2018). We posit that start-ups (Ebersberger and Kuckertz, 2021) and firms with good 
management practices (Bloom et al., 2016) are better equipped to adapt to the crisis. Finally, 
given the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on women in the labour force, we suggest 
that firms with female managers will be less likely to adapt to COVID-19. 
 We test these theoretical predictions using a large dataset of more than 11,000 firms 
across 28 countries. We construct this dataset by combining data from the World Bank on the 
latest rounds of Enterprise Surveys (2018/2019) with a new COVID tracker follow-up survey 
(May–June 2020) to find out which firms are more likely to adapt successfully to COVID-19. 
These standardized surveys benefit from a large international representation and from a 
representative, stratified sample of firms for each of the economies included. Given these 
 
attributes, we are able to achieve better generalizability of our results across different countries 
and sectors around the world. We use econometric analyses to empirically test our hypotheses. 
Our results provide broad support for our theoretical conjectures, except for the hypothesis 
concerning gender and adaptation. 
We provide several contributions. First, we add to the innovation management literature 
in two ways: (1) by expounding the benefits of innovation for firms, not only in terms of 
increased sales or economic performance, but also in terms of flexibility and adaptability to 
crises; and (2) by showing that start-ups and firms that invest in internal knowledge capabilities 
benefit more from innovation when adapting to environmental conditions post COVID-19. 
While prior literature that has focused on the effects of crises on firms’ ability to innovate 
(Filipetti and Archibugi, 2011; Paunov, 2012), our findings complete this circle and reinforce 
the idea that ‘innovation matters’ by providing an additional element to this manifesto, namely 
the ability to successfully adapt to crises. In addition, we provide explanations for when 
innovation pays off, by focusing on otherwise well-researched subjects such as start-ups (Gries 
and Naudé, 2009) and internal knowledge sources (Colombo et al., 2016) in the context of 
adapting to crises. 
Second, we contribute to ongoing conversations in the field of organizational behaviour 
and strategy on what makes firms more resilient and more adaptable to change. In this way, we 
treat COVID-19 as a global natural experiment and examine the significance of management 
practices and the gender of top managers as two important elements that can affect a firm’s 
chances of adapting successfully. In doing so, we complement previous research in this area 
which has focused on diversification (Helfat, 1997), strategic renewal (Reymen et al., 2015), 
the exploitation of strategic opportunities (Wan and Yiu, 2009) and more recent work (Young 
et al., 2017; Manolova et al., 2020) that has explicitly examined the role of gender in relation 
to responses to crises. 
 
Finally, this article aims to act as a catalyst for future research on the implications of 
COVID-19 for individuals, businesses and society overall. While COVID-19 has generated 
significant academic interest across multiple disciplines, the body of knowledge on the strategic 
and organizational implications of this crisis remains limited to editorial or conceptual pieces 
(Muzio and Doh, 2020) that need empirical validation. Our study is one of the few that is able 
to test theoretical conjectures in a large and international setting of 28 countries and more than 
11,000 firms, which gives it greater generalizability in light of the global and sudden nature of 
the COVID-19 crisis. As more detailed data on firms’ activities and responses becomes 
available, management scholars will be able to test existing theories and propose new ones in 
relation to resilience, adaptation and, more generally, mechanisms for organizations and 
countries to cope in a crisis.  
 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Firms’ responses to crises 
Crises of different types (financial, environmental, political or social) and magnitudes (local, 
regional, international and global) occur periodically around the world, affecting business 
operations. Formally defined as ‘unexpected events that disrupt the normal functioning of 
societies’, crises have significant consequences for businesses that require both strategic 
planning and responses (Smart and Vertinsky, 1984). With few notable exceptions (e.g. Oh and 
Oetzel, 2011; Darendeli and Hill, 2016; Oetzel and Oh, 2021), most research into crises has 
focused on financial events (such as the GFC of 2008 or the Asian financial crisis of 1997) that 
have affected a large number of firms across the world (e.g. Filipetti and Archibugi, 2011; 
Paunov, 2012; Hud and Hussinger, 2015; Zouaghi et al., 2018; De Figueiredo et al., 2019; 
Nemlioglu and Mallick, 2021). 
 
A review of this literature reveals that organizations resort to several types of strategic 
response to crises (Wenzel, Stanske and Lieberman, 2020). Broadly, these strategies can be 
grouped into four categories: (1) retrenchment, (2) perseverance, (3) exit and (4) innovation. 
Retrenchment involves contracting the firm’s activities by reducing costs, assets, and products 
in markets in which it is involved (Robbins and Pearce, 1993). While this is intuitive from a 
cost and risk minimization point of view, empirical findings regarding its usefulness for 
performance, particularly in the long run, are mixed. For example, De Figueiredo et al. (2019) 
showed that a reduction in business scope due to a crisis may result in losses for firms, and 
these losses increase with the degree of relatedness between business units that are closed and 
those that continue. This resonates with other scholarly arguments regarding the lack of viability 
of such measures, and the negative externalities of firms’ internal values and capabilities 
(Ndofor, Vanevenhoven and Barker, 2013).  
Perseverance involves measures to preserve the status quo of the firm and minimize the 
impact of the crisis. It achieves a more stable and predictable operation, which is especially 
useful when there is a lot of volatility due to the crisis (Stieglitz et al., 2016). In such instances 
firms that persevere (or ‘keep a steady course’) are less exposed to risk and failure, ultimately 
improving their chances of survival in the post-crisis period (Chakrabati, 2015). Firm-specific 
capabilities such as core competences (De Carolis et al., 2009) and flexible managerial practices 
(Lim, Das and Das, 2009) remain paramount in this process. 
Exit refers to instances in which a firm stops its activity, either because it has become 
impossible to operate, or because managers and owners do not believe the organization will 
survive the crisis (Argyres, Bigelow and Nickerson, 2015). An interesting study by Oh and 
Oetzel (2011) examined under which circumstances multinational firms chose to exit 
international markets: they found that firm exit was more likely in the case of terrorist threats 
or technological disasters than natural disasters, and that the quality of institutional 
 
environments in these host countries mitigates this relationship. While exit is perceived as a 
negative outcome for the firm, it also has some positives, as it allows for resource conservation 
and strategic renewal and avoids the stigma of bankruptcy or market failure (Ren, Hu and Cui, 
2019; Wan, Chen and You, 2015). 
 Finally, a more proactive – albeit riskier and costlier – response to crises is to innovate 
in an attempt to match the current environmental conditions and changes in demand due to the 
crisis. As brilliantly put by Winston Churchill, we should ‘never let a good crisis go to waste’. 
A crisis presents a perfect opportunity to modify or change strategic and operational parameters 
of a firm (Bryson, 1981). As such, innovations relating to products, processes, organizational 
practices, strategies and priorities are all feasible in the context of a crisis (Tripsas, 1997). In 
line with this argument, prior studies document that crises are conducive to increasing business 
innovation in terms of scope and scale (Reymen et al., 2015), investments in complementary or 
substitute technologies (Helfat, 1997), and making use of financial slack to engage in strategic, 
high-payoff actions (Wan and Yiu, 2009). Thus, innovative approaches can be an effective 
response to mitigate the negative effects of a crisis and to potentially emerge stronger from a 
challenging period. 
 
2.2 Innovation during a crisis 
Despite the enabling role innovation plays in tackling crises, most of the literature has focused 
so far solely on the effects of crises on firm innovative performance. Thus, crises increase the 
concentration of innovative activities within a small group of fast-growing firms and favour 
those that pursue explorative technological strategies (Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz, 2013a), 
reduce overall investment in innovation and incentivize start-ups to engage in more radical 
innovations (Archibugi, Filippetti and Frenz, 2013b). The effects of crises on firm innovation 
are also mediated by the quality of a country’s innovation systems (as reflected by human 
 
resources (HR), high-tech sector specialization, or financial development) (Filippetti and 
Archibugi, 2011). A firm’s involvement in innovative activities during a crisis appears to be 
contingent on its access to public funding (Paunov, 2012) or R&D subsidies (Hud and 
Hussinger, 2015), the quality of its management (Nemlioglu and Mallick, 2021), and its focus 
on R&D investments and radical innovations (Antonioli and Montressor, 2021).  
Very recent studies on the effects of COVID-19 complement this body of knowledge 
through qualitative evidence regarding the role of exaptation1/repurposing (Ardito, Coccia and 
Petruzzelli, 2021; Liu, Beltagui and Ye, 2021) and open innovation via crowd funding 
(Vermicelli, Cricelli and Grimaldi, 2021) in developing innovations to cope with the medical, 
social and economic challenges raised by COVID-19. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, while innovation remains one of the most lucrative and impactful strategies firms have 
at their disposal to combat the negative effects of a crisis, we still lack knowledge on the reversal 
of this relationship: that is, whether firms that innovate stand a better chance of adapting to 
crises, and in particular to complex, global crises such as COVID-19. 
 
2.3 Innovation and firms’ adaptation to a crisis 
In this section we will argue that innovating firms stand a better chance of adapting to the 
COVID-19 crisis, combining theoretical rationales from the literature on dynamic capabilities 
and management. 
Defined as the ability ‘to perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing organizational 
resources, for the purpose of achieving a particular end result’ (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003: 999), 
dynamic capabilities are often seen as responsible for the advancement of firms’ long-term 
objectives (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Innovation represents changes in terms of market offering 
and organizational practices and has direct effects on firm performance through the 
 
1 A process by which features acquire functions for which they were not originally adapted or selected. 
 
reconfiguration of organizational resources and routines (Einsenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Hence, conducting in-house R&D (Pisano, 1994) or acquiring external knowledge through 
external R&D (Beneito, 2006) contributes directly to firms’ learning and innovation, offering 
greater potential for recombination of resources, which in turn facilitates adaptation to a new 
environment (Schumpeter, 1934). In this way, engagement in formal R&D efforts yields 
valuable know-how that can easily be redirected towards dealing with the consequences of an 
unexpected crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Second, product and process innovations are invaluable dynamic capabilities (Piening 
and Salge, 2015), providing firms alternative ways to deal with the crisis (Helfat, 1997). While 
product innovation is commonly regarded as a key prerequisite for market entry, following the 
Schumpeterian argument of creative destruction, process innovation helps firms to secure their 
market position, given the available pool of products and resources (Damanpour et al., 2009). 
Having complementary assets provides firms with alternative business segments or niches that 
can provide ‘escape routes’ for innovating firms. For instance, Helfat (1997) shows that in the 
oil crisis of the 1970s, firms that engaged in innovations around coal conversion were more 
successful in the long run than those that didn’t. This also resonates with the idea that 
engagement in strategic renewal and widening of the scope of a business are creative, efficient 
responses to a crisis (Ettlie, Bridges and O'Keefe, 1984; Reymen et al., 2015).  
Third, the degree of responsiveness and the speed of adaptation depends very much on 
the type of manager a firm has and how much attention they pay to changes in the environment. 
Managers should notice environmental changes, interpret them and react strategically to best 
position their organization (Cho and Hambrick, 2006). In particular, managers of innovative 
firms need to be aware of the latest technological trends in their markets to successfully oversee 
strategic investments in innovation and product development in these areas (Tushman and 
Rosenkopf, 1996). Subsequently, managers directly trigger organizational changes, initiating 
 
changes in R&D strategies or the development of new products (Kor, 2006; Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi, 1995), thereby determining a firm’s ability to adapt to a turbulent or changing 
environment. 
Finally, managers of innovative firms need to pay attention to changes in technology or 
consumer behaviour that might impact their businesses (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). While 
investment and innovation outputs provide opportunities for firms to adapt and create a demand 
for their products or services, positive outcomes are always subject to uncertainty. This is where 
managerial skills and attention prove to be very useful, in terms of both picking a strategic 
direction and acting fast and efficiently to re-combine existing resources to serve a new 
objective or goal (King and Tucci, 2002). Hence, good managerial skills and attention – which 
are commonly found in highly innovative firms – are particularly useful for dealing with rapid 
technological changes and shifts in taste or consumer preference (Khanagha, Volberda, and 
Oshri, 2017), such as those that have taken place since COVID-19.  
In conclusion, both managerial attention and dynamic capability arguments suggest that 
innovative capabilities provide avenues through which firms can strategically reorient or adapt 
to a different environment as a result of the recent pandemic, albeit using different mechanisms. 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Firms that engage in innovation will be more likely to successfully adapt their 
activities in response to COVID-19. 
 
2.4 Different sources of knowledge 
While most of the literature on the link between innovation and crises has focused on the 
consequences of crises for innovating firms (Archibugi et al., 2013; Paunov, 2012; Filipetti and 
Archibugi, 2011), the role of internal versus external knowledge in the process of innovation 
remains largely uncovered (Colombo et al., 2016). The notable exception remains the study by 
 
Zouaghi et al. (2018), which examines the role of external versus internal knowledge sources 
on innovative performance of Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Their study 
suggests that both internal and external knowledge sources lead to higher levels of innovation, 
in terms of both radical and incremental innovations. Moreover, these knowledge sources 
appear to mitigate the negative effects of a crisis on the innovative performance of Spanish 
SMEs. 
 Building on this work, we examine how different knowledge sources for innovating 
firms affect their chances of successfully adapting to COVID-19. Specifically, we argue that 
reliance on, and development of, strong internal knowledge capabilities gives firms a better 
chance of adapting, for the following reasons. First, internal investments in knowledge 
generation, such as R&D activities, improve firms’ learning capabilities as well as their 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). In turn, strong 
capabilities in these areas will provide these firms with internal resources they can employ to 
deal with an unexpected crisis (Zouaghi et al., 2018). Second, such investments would also 
include hiring staff and training them to carry out skilled R&D activities, which often brings a 
strong, tacit component to knowledge creation inside a firm (Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003). 
Highly educated, skilled human capital is essential to translate tacit knowledge and innovation 
into practical ways that a firm can adapt to new environmental conditions (Martínez-Sánchez, 
Vicente-Oliva, and Pérez-Pérez, 2020). Such skills and expertise are particularly useful in 
dealing effectively and innovatively with crises. 
 Greater reliance on external sources of knowledge will leave firms more exposed to the 
crisis, and less likely to successfully adapt to it. One obvious drawback of heavy reliance on 
external sources of know-how during a crisis such as COVID-19 is the breakdown of ties 
between firms and nations across the globe. While the rise of globalization has shifted the ‘make 
versus buy’ debate relating to knowledge creation in favour of having both internal and external 
 
sources via ambidextrous strategies (Im and Rai, 2008; Krammer, 2016), COVID-19 has led to 
severe disruption to global value chains, exports, foreign direct investments and collaboration, 
particularly across national borders (Gereffi, 2020; Verbeke and Yuan, 2021). Thus, firms that 
rely more heavily on such strategies for acquiring knowledge are less likely to secure it, and 
thus also less likely to use it for adaptation. A second important reason for the diminishing 
importance of external knowledge sources for a firm’s adaptation is the strategic importance of 
knowledge as a competitive advantage during a crisis, which makes knowledge ‘creators’ less 
inclined to share it with other firms in their value chains (Caloghirou et al., 2021) As such, we 
can see large disparities in terms of knowledge creation between high-tech and low-tech 
industries, but also between firms within an industry (Berchicci, Tucci and Zazzara, 2014). 
 Given the above, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Firms that rely on internal rather than external sources of knowledge for 
innovation will be more likely to successfully adapt their activities in response to 
COVID-19. 
 
2.5 Start-ups versus established firms 
In addition to focusing on innovation and investment in internal resources and capabilities, we 
expect older, more established firms to have inherently lower chances of adapting to COVID-
19 than newer firms, including start-ups. This is supported by several reasons. 
First, the COVID-19 crisis has emphasized the need to adapt fast and appropriately to  
the challenges of the new environment. This is reflected in the strategic response time: that is, 
the gap between the identification of new needs or requirements and the time taken by a firm 
to meet them (Ellwood et al., 2017). Older, more experienced organizations usually exhibit 
stricter (i.e., precise, scheduled), more cyclical (i.e. evolving around regular boom–bust 
business cycles) and internally focused (i.e. focused on the firm itself rather than on external 
 
conditions) time orientations than start-ups. Given the significant degree of uncertainty 
introduced by the COVID-19 crisis, such time orientation norms would put established firms at 
a disadvantage compared to start-ups when it comes to adapting their innovative activities to 
respond to the crisis (Enersberger and Kuckerts, 2021). 
Second, by definition, start-ups use exploratory, iterative organizational approaches to 
define their business model. As such, when compared to established firms,  they often have a 
leaner structure (Frederiksen and Brem, 2017), stronger external and stakeholder orientation 
(Kuckertz, 2019) and more pragmatic business approaches (Sarasvathy, 2001), which allow 
them to better align to the needs of a post COVID-19 market. Lower rigidity and leaner 
hierarchies also result in outward-looking, innovation-focused approaches to their business, 
putting start-ups in a better position to engage in discovery and experimentation in response to 
COVID-19. These provide them with better chances of adaptation than well-established firms. 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
H3: The benefits of innovation for successfully adapting a firm’s activities post-
COVID-19 will be greater for start-ups than for established firms.  
 
2.6 Managerial factors: best practices and female managers 
Managerial factors enhance existing organizational strengths and assets and facilitate the ability 
of firms to successfully adapt to new challenges (Eggers and Kaplan, 2009). Thus, managers 
can provide powerful explanations for why firms in the same industry, and with similar pools 
of resources, may respond very differently to external shocks (Osborne Stubbart, and 
Ramaprasad, 2001) or fail to adapt to environmental changes (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). In 
this study, we focus on two managerial factors that we believe to be particularly salient for 
firms’ adaptation to COVID-19: best management practices and the role of female managers.  
 
 Comprehensive, well-defined management practices are a prominent reason behind 
performance differentials across firms in the same industry or region (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007). These measures of managerial practice vary significantly across firms, industries and 
countries, and have been strongly associated with a firm’s productivity, profitability and 
chances of survival (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011). While studies have focused on linking 
individual management practices (e.g. incentive pay, performance feedback, teamwork, 
autonomy and performance measures) to a firm’s performance across multiple domains (such 
as economic, social, innovative), there is also a strong case to be made for the complementary 
nature of these practices in jointly affecting positively a firm’s performance (Chadwick, Super 
and Kwon, 2015). Building on this perspective, we argue that good management practices 
(broadly defined) give firms a much better chance of adapting to crises, in accordance with 
dynamic capabilities theory. 
To survive and thrive, firms need to renew their competences by ‘appropriately 
adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organization skills, resources and 
functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment’ (Teece et al, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1997: 515). This has implications for the type of management practices 
introduced. For instance, better communication and higher autonomy for employees leads to 
greater cohesion and congruence between organizational and individual goals (Lee and Kelley, 
2008), while well-defined incentives and performance-monitoring policies leads to more 
learning and experimentation within organizations (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Overall, well-
defined, sophisticated management practices that cater to the organizational needs and profile 
of the firm in any way (appraisal schemes, training, recruitment, selection and induction 
practices, etc.) will support exploration, knowledge sharing and proactive risk taking (Shipton 
et al., 2005; Barros and Lazzarini, 2012; Zoghi et al., 2010), which will increase a firm’s 
chances of adapting to a crisis. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
H4a: Firms with well-defined HR management practices will be more likely to 
successfully adapt their activities in response to COVID-19.  
Another salient factor regarding the role of management practices is the characteristics of the 
individual managers who oversee a firm’s operations and strategic responses. From the limited 
knowledge we have, the gender of a manager appears to have particular relevance for crisis 
management. Prior research into gender of managers and firms’ performance suggests that 
women are less likely to become managers (Jennings and Brush, 2013) than men and, when 
they do, their firms face more resource constraints (Boden and Nucci, 2000) which often results 
in underperformance (Jennings and McDougald, 2007). Nevertheless, the evidence on a 
potential gender gap in terms of managerial performance is far from conclusive: there have been 
multiple calls in the literature to expand on research and seek clarification with regards to 
gender issues and management in organizations (Kalnins and Williams, 2014). In this study we 
take this advice and examine this issue in the context of COVID-19. 
 We contend that firms with female managers are less likely to adapt successfully to this 
crisis for three reasons. First, the current crisis has involved an unprecedented change in the 
work–home boundary (Alon et al., 2020). The closure of schools and nurseries and the 
imposition of lockdown by local and national governments has resulted in huge pressure on 
parents to tackle education, childcare and work-related tasks at the same time at home 
(Derndorfer et al., 2021). While these conflicting work–family demands have all affected firms 
in general, as employees having to juggle their jobs while acting as parents and educators, we 
expect that this strain would have been more accentuated for females than for males. The limited 
evidence we have on this issue suggests that, during the pandemic, the average time spent on 
childcare and household chores has increased more for women than it has for men (Hupkau and 
Petrongolo, 2020; Dang and Nguyen, 2021). This implies, on average, that women who are 
managers would have less time to deal with work issues and the aftermath of the crisis 
 
(Manolova et al., 2020), thus decreasing the chances of female-managed firms to successfully 
adapt to COVID-19. 
 Second, scholars have documented significant behavioural differences between men and 
women in terms of risk aversion, which in turn affects the decisions they make in high-
uncertainty scenarios (Jennings and Brush, 2013). For instance, some studies suggest that 
women respond very differently to large, external shocks such as a natural disasters or crises 
(Bradshaw, 2013), often by overestimating the probability or consequences of such catastrophic 
events (Young et al., 2017). Moreover, female managers and business owners tend to be more 
risk averse than male managers, and tend to take a long-term view, which prompts them to 
implement measures to build organizational resilience in the long run rather than coming up 
with short-term, unplanned solutions to a crisis (Danes et al., 2009). As such, female managers 
or owners might be less likely to adapt quickly their business model and operations, but rather 
adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach before making any strategic commitments (Morrow and 
Enarson, 1996; Gimenez-Jimenez et al., 2020).  
In light of all the above arguments, we posit that: 
H4b: Firms that have female managers will be less likely to successfully adapt their 




3.1 Data sources and sample 
To test our hypotheses we employ a novel dataset of more than 14,000 firms across 41 countries, 
including both developed and developing nations. We put together this dataset by combining 
World Bank’s COVID Survey administered in the period May-June 2020 with the latest wave 
of Enterprise Surveys (also from the World Bank) from either 2018 or 2019 (pending on the 
 
country). These are stratified firm-level surveys which include questions on firm innovative 
capabilities as well as their impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and ability of firms to cope 
with it. Moreover, the implementation of the questionnaire is designed to retain 
representativeness of firms across regions and sectors for these countries. After removing all 
missing observations for our main variables of interest (i.e., innovation and adaptation to 
COVID-19) we are left with a sample of roughly 11,000 firms across 28 countries worldwide2. 
A breakdown of observations by country and industry is provided in Appendix A (Tables A1 
and A2). In addition, Table 1 presents a short description of the variables with descriptive 
statistics, while Table 2 displays pairwise correlations. 
 
Dependent variable. Our main measure for firm adaptability captures firm responses in terms 
of production and as a result of learning processes (Levy, 1965). We use the following item in 
the survey (“Has this establishment adjusted or converted, partially or fully, its production or 
the services it offers in response to the COVID-19 outbreak?) and code it into a binary variable 
covid19_adapt which equals 1 if the firm has adjusted its production in response to COVID-
19, and zero otherwise. In addition, we consider more proxies for firm adaptability in our 
robustness checks. 
 
Independent variables. Our main proxy for a firm’s innovative capabilities is R&D 
investments. In this way we are also able to distinguish whether the R&D focus is on internal 
sources or external ones. We code firm’s responses to the question (“During the last fiscal year 
did this establishment spend on research and development activities”) into a binary variable 
(R&D) for our analysis. In the robustness section we will employ also other proxies for firm 
innovation to check the relationship between innovation and firm adaptation to crises. 
 
2 The notable exception in this regard is the availability of management practices questions which is confined to 
only about 4,000 firms.   
 
 We measure reliance on external (and respectively internal) knowledge sources using 
two questions in the surveys (“Over the last three years, did this establishment spend on 
research and development activities contracted with other companies?/ within the 
establishment?”). These are coded as two binary variables (R&D external and R&D internal) 
capturing a firm’s reliance on these two sources. In addition, we measure acquisition of external 
knowledge (also binary) using the following question “During the past three years has the 
establishment spent on acquisition of external knowledge?”. 
 We also code start-ups as those firms that have been established in the past five years 
(Ebersberger and Kuckertz, 2021) and firms with a female top manager (female mgm). Finally, 
to capture best management practices we follow the conventions in this literature and employ 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and derive a composite indicator using multiple questions 
from the Enterprise Surveys (Laursen and Foss, 2003; Beugelsdijk, 2008). We include 5 
potential variables to the relevant management policies using PCA with orthogonal varimax 
rotation to better fit the data (Abdi and Williams, 2010). For a detailed description of these 
variables please see Table A3 (Appendix A). Three of these factors (performance monitoring, 
strategic agility and target awareness) load into a factor with Eigen value of 1.18 which label 
Mgm practices (Table A4) and subsequently use in our econometric analyses. 
 
Controls. To account for any idiosyncratic effects between different industries in terms of their 
natural propensity to be affected by (and thus adapt to) COVID-19, we employ industry fixed-
effects through all our estimations. Moreover, we include a wide range of firm-level controls to 
ensure that firms’ ability to adapt is correctly identified in relation to firm innovative 
capabilities. 
The first such control variable is firm size. Larger firms tend to be both more innovative 
and successful compared to smaller firms, as they often have more resources and dedicated 
capabilities to utilize in their activities. Firm size is measured as the total number of employees 
 
at the end of the year preceding the survey (in logarithmic form, lnsize). Moreover, older firms 
may have more experience with such crises and hence might be better equipped to deal with 
these disruptions (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004). We therefore control for firm age (lnage) in 
all our regressions, by using a measure derived from the year of the survey minus the reported 
first year of operations. Another important boost in terms of resources, ideas and new 
knowledge is engagement in exports via learning-by-exporting (Golovko and Valentini 2011). 
To account for any learning effects from exposure to other markets we include a variable 
(exporter) measuring whether the firm exports or not either directly or indirectly. In addition, 
as experienced managers poses significant know-how and possibly experience in dealing with 
these crises as their tenure increases, we control for managerial experience as an important 
source for know-how which has been strongly correlated with firm performance (Bloom and 
Van Reenen 2010). We therefore control for managerial experience (manexp) as the number of 
years the manager has been working in this industry. Furthermore, access to finance remains 
paramount for a firm’s growth and innovation (Krammer, 2019). Finance is a dummy variable 
that has a value of 1 for firms that have a credit line from a private bank and 0 otherwise. Finally, 
foreign participation in both public and privately owned enterprises has positive effects on firm 
performance (Girma, Gong, and Görg 2009). To account for these effects we use foreignown, 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 a firm has a majority foreign ownership (greater than 
50 percent), and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2 Estimation strategy and econometric issues 
To estimate the impact of innovation capabilities and other firm characteristics on its 
adaptability to COVID-19 as a binary outcome (cov19_adapt) we employ a probit model and 
estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑐𝑜𝑣19_𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑓𝑠𝑐= Φ{𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑒𝑎𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑒,𝑎𝑓 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑔𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑓 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑔𝑚𝑓 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑓 + 𝜆𝑠𝑐 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟} 
where cov19_adapt is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm has adapted its production 
to COVID-19 challenges in 2020 or not; Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution; 
Innovation refers to a firm’s innovative capabilities (as proxied by its ability to introduce new 
products, processes, invest in R&D, etc.), Knowledge refers to sources of knowledge being 
either internal (i), external (e) or acquired (a) while the rest of the DVs follow our hypotheses 
testing whether start-ups, management practices and having female managers affects firm’s 
chances to adapt to COVID19.  f, s, c are indexes for firms, industries and countries; controls 
include all the firm-specific variables detailed in the previous section; λsc are the industry 
(sector) and country fixed effects. 
By design, endogeneity is reduced in this setting. All our explanatory variables come 
from Enterprise Surveys carried out either in 2019 or 2018 (pending on the country) which asks 
firms of their product, process and R&D investments, knowledge sources in the past three years 
of that date (i.e., 2016-2019), while the management practice questions refer to the previous 
financial year (i.e., 2017-2018) . In turn, our DV (i.e., firm’s ability to adapt to COVID-19) 
comes from the follow-up COVID Survey carried out in May 2020, so reverse causality is highly 
implausible. Nevertheless, we have successfully conducted additional analyses (listed under 
Robustness checks section) to deal with potential endogeneity at the firm level (i.e., the non-
random nature of the distribution of innovation and adaptation capabilities across firms). 
In addition, common-method bias (CMB) is often investigated when dealing with 
survey data. Our main source of data (the ES) has embedded in it a few procedural remedies to 
tackle CMB, namely: 1. All respondents and firms are anonymized 2. The questions about 
innovation potential and firm-specific aspects are in different sections in the survey thus 
 
preventing respondents to answer them strategically; 3. The questions about the impact of 
covid-19 have been asked as a follow-up of the survey in May 2020 which further reduces the 
risk of respondents biasing their answers to serve a certain objective. Furthermore, we have also 
investigated this issue empirically by conducting Harman’s one factor test and the results 
confirm that more than one factor is responsible for the bulk of variance in our variables. In 
addition, the results of a common latent factor analysis (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and 
Podsakoff, 2003) reveals similarly that multiple factors are responsible for the variance behind 
these variables, supporting the idea that CMB is not an issue in this case. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Main results 
Our results are presented in Table 3. We start with Model 1 where all controls are introduced 
alongside industry and country fixed effects to control for any unobserved heterogeneity among 
industries and nations in terms of adapting to COVID-19. In line with our expectations, larger 
firms (more resources) and younger (more agile, open to change) firms appear to be better 
equipped to adapt their production to these new challenges. Interesting enough, managerial 
experience appears to be negatively correlated with adaptation and mildly statistically 
significant suggesting that extensive experience in the industry might actually cause sluggish 
responses, particularly in the case of massive disruptions like COVID19 which require a shift 
in paradigm and responses which as farther from usual ones. Finally, foreign owned firms 
appear to be at disadvantage as most of the responses would be tailored to the national needs of 
multiple countries where they operate. 
Next, Model 2 tests our baseline hypothesis, namely that innovating firms will be more 
likely to adapt successfully to COVID-19 than non-innovating firms using R&D investment as 
a proxy. Indeed, the coefficient of R&D dummy variable is positive and significant confirming 
 
our intuition. This effect is also further enhanced by the size of the respective firm, so that the 
effect is more pronounced for larger firms than for medium and smaller ones. Model 3 tests our 
second hypothesis by decomposing a firm’s R&D efforts by sources of knowledge employed 
(i.e., internal R&D, outsourced/contracted-out R&D and acquisition of external knowledge). 
The coefficients of these variables indicate clearly that firms which rely on internal R&D have 
a much higher and statistically significant probability to successfully adapt to COVID-19. 
Model 4 tests our 3rd hypothesis and the coefficient of the interaction between R&D and the 
start-up dummy is both positive and highly significant confirming that the benefits of 
innovation will be greater for start-ups than incumbent firms. Model 5 examines the role of 
management practices and results confirm our Hypothesis 4a namely that firms employing best 
practices will stand a better chance to adapt. In turn, we do not find any significant differences 
in terms of adaptation between female-managed and male-managed firms. The coefficient of 
female manager in our Model 6 and also throughout is positive but statistically insignificant. 
Finally, we  include all orthogonal variables (R&D and components of R&D by knowledge 
sources do not meet this criteria as they are a linear combination of each other, and thus cause 
multicollinearity) in Models 7 and 8 to show that all these factors do contribute jointly to higher 
probability of adaptation to COVID-19. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
To further check the validity of our conjecture regarding the importance of innovation activities 
to COVID-19 successful adaptation, we employ several additional proxies for adaptation which 
come also from the follow-up surveys. These variables measure whether firms have adapted or 
enhanced their business activities in other ways than production (“Did this establishment 
experience any of the following changes in response to the COVID-19 outbreak?:”) from one 
which is based on physical interaction to one which is more online (“Started or increased 
business activity online?”), adoption of delivery or carry-out (“Started or increased delivery or 
 
carry-out of goods or services?”) and adoption of remote work (“Started or increased remote 
work arrangement for its workforce?”).  
 Furthermore, we also follow prior innovation management literature and employ 
different proxies for firm innovativeness by complementing our existing indicators on R&D 
and its sources (which mostly qualify as “inputs” into the innovation process) with additional 
proxies on the “outputs side” by examining whether firms engage in product and process 
innovations (Goedhuys and Veugelers, 2012; Fritsch and Görg, 2015; Krammer, 2019). Thus, 
using the answers to the questions “During the last three years, did your establishment: 
introduce into the market any new or significantly improved products (goods or services)? and 
respectively “… any new or significantly improved production processes including methods of 
supplying services and ways of delivering products?” we compute two binary dependent 
variables (New product and New process), which take the value of 1 for positive (“yes”) 
answers, and 0 otherwise. 
These additional regressions include full-specifications of controls as the main results, 
including country and industry fixed-effects. For brevity, we only report the coefficients of 
interest (i.e., for different innovation proxies used) in Table 4 (Panels a, b, and c) and they are 
consistent with our main estimations, namely regardless of the proxies used to capture 
innovation capabilities, their coefficients are positive and highly significant confirming that 
innovators are much likely to adapt their businesses (across multiple dimensions) in response 
to COVID-19.  
 Furthermore, as discussed in the prior section, while the DV and IDVs are temporally-
segregated thus reducing significantly the chance of reverse causality, endogeneity may still 
arise due to other factors as adaptation and innovative capabilities could be jointly determined 
by industry- (e.g., competition), country- (e.g., institutions), and regional factors (e.g., industrial 
heritage). While we control for these effects on the DV in the form of country and sector fixed-
 
effects, we also investigate these formally by using an instrumental variable probit where 
sector-region-country averages are used to instrument each of the proxies we use for capturing 
innovative capabilities. However, the values of the Wald tests suggest that exogeneity cannot 
be rejected statistically and that our probit results are unbiased. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
COVID-19 has had serious negative societal consequences worldwide. In addition to its 
immediate impact on health, it has also significantly impaired economic activities in many 
countries. As governments worldwide begin to ease lockdowns, firms’ resilience and their 
ability to adapt to a new, very different, environment will be paramount if we are to avoid a 
deep, long-lasting recession. Our research aim revolves around this issue and asks the question: 
which firms are better equipped to deal with radical disruptions such as those that the COVID-
19 crisis has caused? 
In particular, building on insights from dynamic capabilities, managerial cognition and 
organizational responses to crises, we are keen to examine the role of innovators in this 
adaptation process. Our core tenet is that innovators should be better equipped than non-
innovators to deal with the radical changes introduced by COVID-19. This reasoning is 
supported by theoretical arguments from dynamic capabilities and managerial attention 
theories. Dynamic capabilities theories emphasize the ability of organizations to reconfigure 
their assets and resources to adapt to changes in their business environment. Innovating firms 
by definition need to build such capabilities to create innovation (through invention, imitation 
or recombination of existing knowledge). As a result, innovating firms are inherently endowed 
with dynamic capabilities that help them to thrive in fast-moving technological environments 
(Teece et al., 1997; Helfat et al., 2007). In addition, innovating firms tend to pay more attention 
to their external environment. Changes in this environment, in terms of new products or 
 
processes, require significant attention (to changes in the environment, consumers’ taste and 
the competitive landscape), know-how (the evolution of technologies and products) and 
strategic behaviour (combining knowledge from internal and external resources). As a result, 
innovative firms have higher managerial diligence (Eggers and Kaplan, 2009), which is useful 
when dealing with a global crisis such as COVID-19. 
In addition to our main finding regarding the enabling role of innovative capabilities in 
dealing with the COVID-19 crisis, our findings confirmed several other factors that are 
important for firms’ adaptation. First, the source of know-how. We found that, although all 
innovations significantly improve a firm’s chances of adaptation, firms that rely on internal 
knowledge sources stand a better chance of adapting than those that depend on external sources 
(such as contracted-out R&D or licensed/acquired technologies). This is consistent with the 
current picture of the post-pandemic world: most countries have suggested national 
(uncoordinated) responses and financial stimuli in response to the crisis, and external 
connections (e.g. global value chains or distribution chains) have suffered significant disruption 
and an overall reduction in traffic and importance. An interesting future line of research in this 
area could be examining the pros and cons of reliance on external links (to knowledge, markets, 
resources) in the post-pandemic world. 
Second, the relative importance of innovation and knowledge in different firms. Our 
findings suggest that innovation helps many more start-ups to adapt than established firms. 
These results have policy implications, as start-ups are often seen as the future of an economy, 
tapping into new areas that present opportunities for economic growth and development (Gries 
and Naudé, 2009; Frederiksen and Brem, 2017). As such we showcase the importance of 
supporting start-ups and innovative young firms through dedicated policy mechanisms as a way 
to build-up resilience in an economy and also ensure faster recovery from future crises. 
 
Third, the important role of management in tackling a crisis. We looked at the 
management practices that have been implemented and the gender of the managers in charge. 
Regarding the former, we found strong evidence that firms with better management practices 
are more likely to adapt successfully to COVID-19. This lends weight to the argument that  
implementing good management practices (through human resource management (HRM) 
policies) matters. There are also other well-established benefits, mentioned in the literature, 
such as higher productivity, profitability and innovation performance (Laursen and Foss, 2003; 
Beugelsdijk, 2008; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011). With respect to the gender of the manager, 
contrary to our expectations, we did not find, ceteris paribus, any statistical differences between 
firms managed by men and women. 
While overall there has been increased pressure on women during COVID-19 as a result 
of having to work from home, blurring the work–home boundary (Alon et al., 2020), and 
increased childcare and household duties (Landivar et al., 2020), our explanation for this result 
is that female managers are less affected by the pressures introduced by COVID-19 than 
regular, non-management female employees. Female managers are more likely to prioritize 
their careers (e.g., have few or no children, and be the main earner in the household) and have 
the financial resources (e.g., higher income, bonuses, etc.) to circumvent COVID-19 induced 
problems via private solutions (e.g., hire a private nanny for childcare). Future research in this 
area that examined whether gender biases are generic or depend on the level and experience of 
the individual (worker, administrative, managerial, top management, etc.) would be very 
interesting. Similarly, strategy and international business scholars could explore the 
relationship between exports and foreign ownership on one hand, and firm adaptation on the 
other. While this is beyond the scope of the present study, our analyses in which we have used 
these variables as controls suggest systematic effects that can further explain organizational 
responses to the current pandemic. 
 
With this work we propose a couple of contributions. First, to the innovation 
management literature by providing robust, large-scale evidence that innovating firms are more 
likely to cope successfully with COVID-19 challenges than non-innovators. While the bulk of 
studies in this area have examined the consequences of a crisis for innovative performance (e.g. 
Filipetti and Archibugi, 2011; Paunov, 2012), we focus on the other side of this relationship by 
highlighting the importance of innovation for firms’ ability to cope and adapt to crises. 
In addition, we also showcase a couple of contingencies that make innovation more 
valuable for adaptation. Specifically, our findings – that firms that rely on internal knowledge 
sources as opposed to external ones and very young firms (i.e. start-ups) that innovate have a 
better chance of adapting to COVID-19 – are invaluable insights for both managers and 
policymakers in these countries. They also augment existing research on the importance of 
knowledge-sourcing strategies (Fainshmidt et al., 2017; Zouaghi et al., 2018) and the role of 
start-ups (Enersberger and Kuckerts, 2021; Archibugi et al., 2013a; Bessant et al., 2015) during 
turbulent periods or crises. 
Second, this work contributes to previous studies in the organizational behaviour and 
strategy literature (e.g. Helfat, 1997; Reymen et al., 2015; Wan and Yiu, 2009; Wenzel et al., 
2020) by highlighting the importance of management practices in the adaptation process. Best 
practices have long been associated with a firm’s performance, productivity and innovation, 
and we provide another reason (i.e. a better chance of adapting to a crisis) for valuing them and 
employing them on a wide scale. We also contribute to the conversation on gender bias and the 
role crises can play in exacerbating this (Young et al., 2017; Manolova et al., 2020) by 
examining adaptation in enterprises run by women in comparison to enterprises run by men. 
Finally, we hope that this study acts as a catalyst for future empirical investigations into 
these issues, taking advantage of COVID-19 as a global, natural experiment. While the bulk of 
intellectual contributions in management remains editorial and conceptual in nature (Muzio and 
 
Doh, 2020), we hope to motivate more scholars to propose new theories and test existing ones 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, itself a unique and complex crisis (Alon et al., 2020). 
Our findings also have implications for managers and policymakers. Obviously, 
building innovative capabilities, in particular in-house ones, via investments in R&D, training 
and the recruitment of highly skilled R&D personnel, will pay off in multiple ways – by making 
firms more efficient, profitable and innovative, and by allowing them to adapt successfully to 
crises. Thus, managers need to emphasize this strategic response to a crisis while policymakers 
need to facilitate this process (via financial instruments such as tax breaks, subsidies or grants 
and by improving the quality of national innovation systems via collaborative consortia, 
investments in higher education, etc.). In addition, start-ups need to make formal investments 
in innovation (i.e. R&D activities). Without it, given the post-COVID-19 credit and market 
crunch, they are less likely to adapt successfully. Stimulating start-ups to be innovative and 
agile has been a policy objective for decades now, and our findings reinforce this mantra by 
adding an extra element to the list of benefits: namely, the successful adaptation of firms in 
response to a significant crisis. Governments around the world are currently spending huge 
amounts of money on preserving public health, and our findings suggest that such stimuli during 
or after a crisis should focus on boosting firms’ innovative capabilities, not just to promote 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Details Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cov19_adapt 
Has the firm adapted its production to 
covid-19? 14,650 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
lnsize Log firm size (no. employees FT) 20,477 3.32 1.31 0.69 10.31 
lnage Log firm age (2020-year establish) 20,396 2.88 0.69 0.00 5.31 
manexp Manager’s years in the industry 20,575 20.60 11.61 1.00 70.00 
finance Does the firm have access to loans? 20,575 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
exporter 
Is the firm exporting any of its 
products? 20,316 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
foreignown Majority foreign owned (>50%) 15,605 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
R&D Has spent on R&D activities? 20,575 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
R&D internal Has made internal R&D investment? 15,555 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
R&D external 
Has made external (contracted-out) 
R&D investment? 15,550 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Acquisition 
external 
Has spent on acquisition of external 
knowledge? 15,673 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Start-up Established in the last 5 years? 20,575 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Mgm practices 
Composite indicator for best 
management practices (PCA) 5,707 0.00 1.09 -3.28 1.67 




Table 2. Pairwise correlations 
No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 cov19_adapt 1       
2 lnsize 0.0486* 1      
3 lnage -0.0491* 0.2340* 1     
4 manexp -0.0534* 0.0883* 0.4724* 1    
5 finance -0.0111 0.1803* 0.1014* 0.0764* 1   
6 exporter -0.0119 0.3094* 0.1220* 0.0936* 0.1492* 1  
7 foreignown 0.0062 0.2266* -0.0264* -0.0652* -0.0473* 0.1734* 1 
8 R&D 0.0267* 0.2314* 0.0526* 0.0201* 0.1486* 0.2235* 0.0983* 
9 R&D internal 0.0354* 0.2203* 0.0520* 0.0279* 0.1411* 0.2157* 0.0852* 




0.0304* 0.1563* 0.0092 0.0004 0.1003* 0.1293* 0.0942* 
12 Start-up 0.0324* -0.1151* -0.5732* -0.2183* -0.0549* -0.0467* 0.0152* 
13 Mgm practices 0.0446* 0.1829* 0.0587* 0.0062 0.0605* 0.1335* 0.1534* 
14 Female mgm 0.0270* -0.0935* -0.0570* -0.0845* -0.0198* -0.0504* -0.0162* 
         
         
         
No Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8 R&D 1       
9 R&D internal 0.9378* 1      




0.3736* 0.3548* 0.3320* 1    
12 Start-up -0.0092 -0.0082 -0.0032 0.0127 1   
13 Mgm practices 0.1770* 0.1779* 0.1264* 0.1482* -0.0268* 1  
14 Female mgm -0.0380* -0.0347* -0.0248* -0.0066 0.0213* 0.0178 1 




Table 3. Main results. Probit estimations 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
lnsize 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** -0.003 0.049*** -0.006 0.004 
 [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.022] [0.010] [0.022] [0.023]    
lnage -0.042** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.068+ -0.042** -0.078+ -0.089**  
 [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.028] [0.038] [0.020] [0.042] [0.043]    
manexp -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002 -0.002+ -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]    
finance 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.058 0.035 0.055 0.063 
 [0.025] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.045] [0.025] [0.045] [0.046]    
exporter 0.056+ 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.068 0.056+ 0.068 0.069 
 [0.031] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.053] [0.031] [0.053] [0.053]    
foreignown -0.108** -0.104+ -0.113** -0.107+ -0.163** -0.108** -0.177** -0.187*** 
 [0.046] [0.055] [0.056] [0.055] [0.071] [0.046] [0.071] [0.072]    
H1: R&D  0.071**  0.068+   0.041                
  [0.034]  [0.035]   [0.043]                 
H2: R&D 
internal   0.102**     0.129**  
   [0.040]     [0.057]    
R&D external   -0.012     -0.073 
   [0.052]     [0.068]    
Acquisition 
external   0.008     -0.066 
   [0.043]     [0.059]    
Start-up    -0.106   -0.302+ -0.323**  
    [0.075]   [0.154] [0.155]    
H3: R&D x 
Start-up    0.351***   0.598**                
    [0.136]   [0.239]                
H4a: Mgm 
practices     0.069***  0.063*** 0.064*** 
     [0.021]  [0.021] [0.021]    
H4b: Female 
mgm      0.015 0.034 0.031 
      [0.031] [0.059] [0.059]    
H3: R&D 
internal x 
Start-up        0.559**  
        [0.242]    
constant 0.370*** 0.425*** 0.384** 0.450*** 0.600** 0.366*** 0.622** 0.549**  
 [0.136] [0.149] [0.150] [0.155] [0.266] [0.136] [0.274] [0.276]    
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,341 11,331 11,236 11,331 4,196 14,341 4,187 4,140 
Log Likelihood -8010.73 -6184.89 -6127.97 -6181.46 -2364.64 -8010.60 -2357.36 -2324.72 
LR Chi Square 2416.07 1935.64 1933.84 1942.50 748.94 2416.32 753.18 759.25 
 
AIC 16179.46 12497.78 12387.94 12494.92 4853.28 16181.21 4846.72 4785.44 
BIC 16777.56 12967.24 12871.52 12979.05 5246.48 16786.88 5265.14 5215.77 
 Notes: DV is cov19_adapt. All models include country- and industry- fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 




Table 4. Robustness checks: different proxies for firm adaptation to COVID-19 
 
Panel a. DV: In response to COVID-19- Started or increased business activity online?  
Variables Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
R&D 0.139***      
 [0.037]      
R&D internal  0.150***     
  [0.038]     
R&D external   0.046                  
   [0.050]                  
Acquisition external    0.058                 
    [0.044]                 
New product     0.167***                
     [0.028]                
New process      0.143*** 
      [0.033]    
N 11,508 11,483 11,473 11,571 14,469 14,465 
Log Likelihood -5039.83 -5026.79 -5022.58 -5090.80 -6734.77 -6741.27 
 
 
Panel b. DV: In response to COVID-19- Started or increased delivery or carry-out of goods/services?  
Variables Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
R&D 0.139***      
 [0.037]      
R&D internal  0.150***     
  [0.038]     
R&D external   0.046                  
   [0.050]                  
Acquisition external    0.058                 
    [0.044]                 
New product     0.167***                
     [0.028]                
New process      0.143*** 
      [0.033]    
N 11,508 11,483 11,473 11,571 14,469 14,465 




Panel c. DV: In response to COVID-19- Started or increased remote work arrangements for workforce? 
Variables Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
R&D 0.251***                    
 [0.033]                    
R&D internal  0.250***                   
  [0.034]                   
R&D external   0.238***                  
   [0.044]                  
Acquisition external    0.177***                 
    [0.040]                 
New product     0.217***                
     [0.027]                
New process      0.216*** 
      [0.031]    
N 11,560 11,534 11,525 11,632 14,497 14,493 
Log Likelihood -6098.81 -6090.40 -6091.36 -6145.10 -7659.14 -7657.06 






















Table A1. Breakdown of the dataset by country 
Country    Observations Percent of total 
Albania 333 2.96 
Belarus 523 4.65 
Bulgaria 502 4.47 
Croatia 339 3.02 
Cyprus 161 1.43 
Czech Republic 397 3.53 
Estonia 266 2.37 
Georgia 488 4.34 
Greece 523 4.65 
Hungary 612 5.44 
Italy 402 3.58 
Jordan 443 3.94 
Latvia 221 1.97 
Lebanon 360 3.2 
Lithuania 213 1.89 
Macedonia, FYR 287 2.55 
Malta 185 1.65 
Moldova 259 2.3 
Mongolia 281 2.5 
Montenegro 145 1.29 
Morocco 354 3.15 
Poland 795 7.07 
Portugal 718 6.39 
Romania 496 4.41 
Russian Federation 1,040 9.25 
Serbia 335 2.98 
Slovak Republic 322 2.86 
Slovenia 243 2.16 





Table A2. Breakdown of the dataset by industry 
Country    Observations Percent of total 
Food 1,494 13.29 
Tobacco 2 0.02 
Textiles 173 1.54 
Garments 607 5.40 
Leather 87 0.77 
Wood 205 1.82 
Paper 91 0.81 
Publishing, printing, and Recorded 
media 179 1.59 
Refined petroleum product 8 0.07 
Chemicals 160 1.42 
Plastics & rubber 297 2.64 
Non-metallic mineral products 332 2.95 
Basic metals 97 0.86 
Fabricated metal products 870 7.74 
Machinery and equipment 717 6.38 
Electronics 136 1.21 
Precision instruments 59 0.52 
Transport machines 94 0.84 
Furniture 288 2.56 
Recycling 36 0.32 
Construction Section F: 896 7.97 
Services of motor vehicles 292 2.60 
Wholesale 876 7.79 
Retail 2,027 18.03 
Hotel and restaurants 602 5.35 
Transport  Section I 369 3.28 
Transport  Section II 4 0.04 
Transport  Section III 7 0.06 
Transport  Section IV 31 0.28 
Transport  Section V 6 0.05 
IT 201 1.79 








Table A3. Variables employed in the Principal Component Analysis for management 
practices 
Note: All these items come from questions in the Enterprise Survey administered to a subset of countries. All 








Original variable ES and coding strategy Range (re-coded 
variables) 
Perf_monitoring 
Did This Establishment Monitor Any Production/Service 
Performance Indicators? 
0/1 1 – Yes 
2 – No 
-9 – I do not know 
Prov_targets 
Did This Establishment Have Production/Service Provision 
Targets? 
0/1 1 – Yes 
2 – No 
-9 – I do not know 
Strat_agile 
What Best Describes The Time Frame of Production/Service 
Provision Targets? 
0/1 
- Main focus was on short term, less than one year (1) 
- Main focus was on long term, one year or more (2) 
- Combination of short-term and long-term targets (3) 
- Do not know (-9)  
Strat_agile equals 1 if main focus is combination (i.e., 3) 
Awareness 
Who Was Aware of The Production/Service Provision 
Targets At This Establishment? 
1–4 
- Only senior managers (1) 
- Most managers and some production workers (2) 
- Most managers and most production workers (3) 
- All managers and most production workers (4) 
- I do not know (-9) 
Promotion 
How underperformers are dealt with: 
1–4 
- Based solely on performance and ability (1) 
- Based partly on performance and ability, and partly on other 
factors (for example, tenure or family connections) (2) 
- Based mainly on factors other than performance and ability 
(for example, tenure or family connections) (3) 
 
- Non-managers are normally not promoted (4) 
- I do not know (-9) 















Eigen value 1.180 
 
Note: Prov_targets was dropped from the analysis because of zero variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
